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Extractive economies can use the natural resource dividend for 
infrastructure and sustainable development. However, the reality 
of achieving this is far more complex than one might expect. This 
paper aims to present some fresh analysis of data of extractive 
economies to answer three main questions: a. how are extractive 
economies performing with regard to providing basic services 
such as health, education, water and sanitation; b. are there 
patterns of success; and c. what are the implications for policy 
and action especially in the context of the proposed sustainable 
development goals. The first issue of course is to define the 
category extractive economy. Using a new methodology, this 
paper focuses on the top 40 oil economies, top 41 gas economies 
and 56 mineral economies. Because some countries do have all 
three or two of these three natural resources, the overall dataset 
is of 91 countries covering both developed and developing 
economies and in all continents. Data pertaining to years 2002 to 
2012 is analysed here. While some results are perhaps as may be 
expected, there are several disturbing findings as well. Extractive 
economies are among some of the poorly performing countries 
on indicators highly relevant to prosed SDGs on poverty, health, 
water and sanitation, and energy. This highlights the need for a 
strategic focus and developing appropriate mechanisms to use 
the natural resource dividend to make lasting transformation of 
social and economic well-being. 
Key words: Extractive, natural resource, sustainable development, 
health, water 







Extractive economies and Sustainable Development: 
An Analysis of Infrastructure, Health and Social 
Development1 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine some key issues for 
development in the context of extractive economies or resource 
dependent countries. This paper uses a new method of 
categorising countries as extractive economies and based on that 
classification identifies three groups of countries, namely, oil 
economies, gas economies, and mineral economies. Its focus is 
on a selected group of such economies and to examine the 
performance of this group with regard to a number of key 
development indicators of relevance to the Sustainable 
Development Goals currently being considered.  
A key challenge to sustainable development concerns effective 
use of natural resources. Such resources can be a boon or a 
curse. For many low income countries, the abundance of natural 
resources can be a ‘curse2’ (Sachs and Warner,1995;1997; 
Auty,2002) or a ‘trap’ (Collier,2008). In many natural resource 
rich economies, issues related to corruption, poor governance 
and in some cases ethnic conflict pose significant challenges to 
human development. A number of papers in Humphreys et al 
(2007) and Hogan and Sturzenegger (2010) discuss the issues 
related to resource curse and its avoidance. Ross (2012) argues 
                                                                            
1 © PB Anand, 2014. No part of this publication, its charts, figures or tables should 
be reproduced without prior permission from the author.  
2 A number of issues related to macro-economic management, 
inequality, and the role of state  in ‘resource curse’ countries are 
2 A number of issues related to macro-economic management, 
inequality, and the role of state  in ‘resource curse’ countries are 
examined in Humphreys et al (2007). Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) 






that countries rich in petroleum tend to have less democracy, less 
economic stability and greater tendency to civil wars than others 
not having oil. Obi and Rustad (2011) discuss the politics of 
violence in the specific case of Niger Delta. However, it appears 
that the ‘trap’ is not inescapable provided the necessary 
institutions to manage resource allocation problems. Mehlum et 
al (2006) suggest that institutions determine whether the 
relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth rate is negative or positive. Robinson et al (2006) also 
make a similar argument. They focus on the political processes 
and the behaviour of politicians in extracting rents and allocating 
these. They argue that institutions are the key to determining 
whether politicians use high discount rate and prefer resource 
booms or use resources more prudently. A similar institutional 
argument can be seen with regard to how silver boom in 16th 
Century was handled by institutions in Spain3 ( Drelichman and 
Voth, 2008). Kolstad and Wiig (2008) examine the role of 
transparency in fighting corruption in resource rich societies. 
Their analysis suggests that improving transparency may not be 
adequate in lifting the resource curse. Jones Luong and Weinthal 
(2011) include several case studies to argue why oil is not a curse.  
 
Against this background of this literature, this paper aims to 
examine the performance of extractive economies with regard to 
various development indicators. Section 2 of the paper explains 
the methodology of selection of countries. Section 3 presents 
analysis pertaining to five of the proposed seventeen SDGs.  
Section 4 presents some analysis of resource rich countries and 
human development dimensions. Section 5 presents some issues 
for policy and critical action. 
                                                                            
3 Domenech (2008) examines Spain’s growth during 1860-2000 and argues that 
far from acting as a curse, natural resources had a positive effect on 







Are resource rich or extractive economies different? Before we 
can answer this question we must decide which countries must 
be included in the category ‘extractive economies’ and which 
countries must be considered as the control group of ‘non-
resource rich’ economies.  The difficulty is that almost every 
country can be considered to be resource dependent. In their 
papers, Sachs and warner (1995, 1997) used various definitions 
including the share of primary products in exports.  
 
For this paper, we have considered various alternative definitions 
and settled for a simple rule. We looked at the share of resource 
rents in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 and chose all the 
countries that had the share above the world average. In 
particular, we looked at resource rents for oil, gas and mineral 
sectors. 
 
Extractive economy = An economy with resource rents > world 
average resource rents 
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 103  127  131 
TOTAL  219  214  214 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicators 
 
Because some countries have more than one resource, the final 
set of countries used in the analysis includes a few countries 
having all three resources and some having at least two 
resources and thus generating resource rents above the world 
average in that particular resource group. 
The final set of countries is shown in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Countries included in the three categories of extractives 
All three 
lists: Oil, Gas, 
mineral 
8 Uzbekistan, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cote d'Ivoire, Tunisia, 
Russian Federation, Mexico, Iran 
Oil and 
mineral 
3 Ghana, Sudan, Columbia 
Oil and Gas 20 Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Azerbaijan, Brunei 
Darussalam, UAE, Turkmenistan, Bahrain, Algeria, Nigeria, 
Yemen, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, Norway, Egypt, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Venezuela 
Oil only 9 Congo Republic, Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, 
Ecuador,  Cameroon, Albania, Canada 
Gas and 
mineral 
4 Peru, Tanzania, Australia, Indonesia 
Gas only 9 Romania, Netherlands, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Pakistan, New 
Zealand, Argentina, Mozambique, Thailand 
Mineral only 41 Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Suriname, Zambia, Guinea, 
Guyana, Chile, Burkina Faso, Congo DR, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao 
PDR, Eritrea, Mali, Mongolia, Solomon Islands, Zimbabwe, 
Morocco,  South Africa, Armenia, Botswana, Macedonia, 
Togo, Senegal, Jordan, Philippines, Jamaica, Brazil, 
Madagascar, China, Namibia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, India, 





Bosnia and Herzegovina  
TOTAL  94   
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
Extractive economies and development 
performance 
 
In this section, we analyse the performance indicators of the 
three groups of extractive countries in relation to some of the 
sustainable development goals. 
 
SDG1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
 
It is difficult to pin point precisely what proportion of world’s poor 
people are in extractive economies. Worldwide, the proportion of 
population below $1.25 per day of income decreased from 26 to 14 
per cent between 2002 and 2011. However, in extractive 
economies dependent on oil or minerals, on average the $1.25 a 
day poverty appears to have increased during this period.  
 
Table 3: Proportion of people below $1.25 a day poverty 
 
2002 2011 
Top 40 oil economies 12.76 17.06 
Top 41 Gas economies 13.99 6.72 
Top 56 mineral economies 15.94 18.60 
World 26.10 14.50 
 






The share of income received by the bottom 20 per cent of 
population is about 6 per cent and this has actually decreased 




Figure 1: Extractives and SDG1: Income share of bottom 20 per cent of 
population. Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development 
Indicators 
 
In contrast, the share of the top 20 per cent of population is about 
48 per cent in all three groups of extractive economies.  
 
SDG2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition 
 
In general, extractive economies seem to be slightly more 
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Figure 2: Extractives and share of food imports in merchandise imports.  Source: 
Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicators 
 
In some of the extractive economies, a significant proportion of 
children under the age of five years are malnourished. This is 
evident from the figures in table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Selected extractive economies where a significant proportion of 
children are malnourished 
 Country Year %	  of	  children	  under	  5	  
malnourished 
Top	  40	  oil	  	  countries Congo,	  Rep. 2005 11.80 










2000	   2005	   2010	   2015	  
Food	  imports	  (%	  of	  merchandise	  
imports)	  	  
Top	  40	  Oil	  
economies	  











 Cameroon 2011 15.10 
Top	  41	  gas	  countries Bangladesh 2010 30.89 
 Mozambique 2011 15.60 
 Nigeria 2011 24.39 
Top	  56	  mining	  countries Mauritania 2012 19.50 
 Burkina	  Faso 2010 26.20 
 Congo	  Dem	  Rep 2010 24.20 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicators 
 
This suggests that though extractives generate significant 
additional resources, either these resources are not being 
targeted properly to benefit the poor or the mechanisms used are 
not having the necessary impact on poverty and ending hunger. 
 
 In some cases, new rush towards extractives can create 
destabilising factors which might contribute to increasing poverty 
or compound the channels through which redistribution takes 
place. In the context of West Africa, Bazilian et al (2013) argue that 
the new gas and oil discoveries in that region have not always 
created positive impacts.  
 
My own analysis of Lao PDR suggests that the recent opening of 
mining sector and increasing resource rents from mining are 
correlated with a reduction in $1.25 a day poverty from 41 per cent 
in 2002 to 30.3 per cent in 2012. Until 2004, Lao PDR did not have 
any resource rents but from 2005 share of resource rents in GDP 
increased from 3 per cent to about 14 per cent by 2012. Though 
not all reduction in poverty can be attributed to the resource 
rents, the above data suggests that whether by intention or 
coincidence, the mineral boom is appearing to be making an 
impact on poverty. 
 







A mechanism through which resource rents can be used for 
improving health is by allocating some of the rents directly 
towards health expenditure. However, public expenditure on 
health is only a part of overall health spending and also 
increased spending does not automatically translate into 
healthy lives. While we note these caveats, the broad picture 
of resource economies suggests that on the whole in all the 
extractive country groups, between 2002 and 2012, health 
spending per capita increased almost three times especially 
in oil and gas economies. Though some of this is nominal 
increase, in real terms too there has been an increase 
though the extent of increase more modest than is 
suggested in figure 3 below. On the whole the level of 
spending per capita on health is much lower in mineral 
economies. Though this has increased four-fold between 








Figure 3: Health expenditure per capita increased significantly. Source: Author’s 
calculation based on World Development Indicators 
However, in both the two top gas economies, namely, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Turkmenistan, health expenditure per capita 
decreased between 2002 and 2012. It has also been rather 
erratic in the top two oil economies, namely Congo Republic and 
Kuwait and also in the two mineral economies namely, Mauritania 
and Papua New Guinea.  
Another indicator of healthy lives is life expectancy. We looked at 
female life expectancy in particular as an indicator of both health 
and also gender equality. Female life expectancy increased in the 
top 40 oil economies between 2002 and 2012 from around 68.5 
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female life expectancy for non-oil producers was higher and 
increased from around 70 years to 73.1 years. The story is similar 
with regard to 56 mineral economies as compared with non-
mineral economies having greater life expectancy. In 2002, the 
gap between these two groups of countries was 8 years and this 
decreased slightly to 6 years of gap by 2012 but still non-mineral 
countries having longer life expectancy for women. Australia and 
Norway both with over 80 years of life expectancy lead the world; 
however, some extractive economies such as Botswana with 45 
years of life expectancy and Cote d’Ivoire with 51 years of life 
expectancy are also at the bottom of the world distribution of 
countries by female life expectancy. Thus extra resources from 
extractives are not translating to additional years of healthy life in 
many of the extractive countries. 
Calain (2008) analyses health systems in Africa’s resource rich 
countries and develops a framework to analyse health systems. 
The paper concludes that traditional resource curse analysis 
which tends to focus on economic aspects needs to be 
broadened to include health systems perspectives.  
 
SDG4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education  
 
Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP decreased 
between 2002 and 2012 in all the three sets of extractive 
countries in our analysis. 
 
Ghana, Tunisia, Indonesia and Mexico are among the exceptions 
where public spending on education during the decade has 
actually increased. 
 
An alternative measure is to look at education expenditures as a 
whole in the gross national income. [For example, even if public 
spending can decrease, if resource rents are leading to higher 





income on education.] Education expenditures as a share of gross 
national income has remained around 4 per cent in all the three 
groups if extractive economies. Two of the best performers are 
Uzbekistan and Botswana- both extractive economies spending 
nearly 10 per cent of gross national income on education. 
 
Adjusted net enrolment rate in primary school age worldwide has 
been increasing from 86 per cent in 2002 to 91 per cent in 2012. 
For the 41 gas economies, net enrolment rate has always been 
greater than the world average. This increased from 90 per cent 
in 2002 to 95 per cent in 2012. For the 40 oil economies, this has 
been greater than the world average for most of the time but has 
been somewhat erratic rather than showing a smooth trend. In 
the case of the 56 mineral economies, throughout the decade of 
2002 to 2012, net enrolment rate in primary has always been 
lower than the world average and increased from 82 per cent in 
2002 to 86 per cent in 2012.  
 
Literacy rate among the youth (15 to 24 years of age) can be 
crucial to youth employment. On this indicator, some of the 
extractive economies are facing a critical situation. In Chad and 
Cote d’Ivoire, more than a half of all the young persons are not 
literate. In a few other extractive economies, up to 3 out of every 
















Table 5: Literacy rate among the youth- selected extractive economies 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicators 
 
SDG5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls 
 
Gender equality is a complex issue and a number of factors 
including history, culture and persistence of conflict can have a 
significant impact on many of the gender indicators.  
 
When we look at an indicator such as share of women in non-
agricultural employment (which can be considered to be an 
indicator of modernisation and industrialisation), the some of the 
results are disconcerting. While gas economies do very well on 
the whole, oil economies perform not so well on this indicator. 
Some individual extractive countries such as Guinea, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Guatemala are among the weakest 
performers with the share of women in non-agricultural 
employment being less than 30 per cent in each case in 2012. 
 
 Country Year Literacy rate, youth total  
(% of people ages 15-24) 
Top 40 oil producer Chad 2012 48.92 
 Cote d'Ivoire 2012 48.31 
Top 41 gas producers Yemen 2012 87.41 
 Banglades 2012 79.93 






Figure 4: An indicator of gender equality- share of women in non-agricultural 
employment.  Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development 
Indicators 
 
SDG7: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water 
and sanitation for all 
In the case of oil and gas economies, the proportion of population 
having access to improved sources of water has steadily 
increased in line with world average from around 82 per cent to 
close to 90 per cent between 2002 and 2012. However, for the 56 
mineral rich countries, the progress has been limited. It has 
certainly increased from around 61 per cent in 2002 to just under 
70 per cent in 2012. However, even by the MDG target, these 
countries would have missed the target by 2015 significantly. 
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Share	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  women	  employed	  in	  the	  
nonagricultural	  sector	  (%	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  Moldova	  





of the ten bottom countries in terms of per cent of population with 




Figure 5: Access to improved source of water- 10 bottom performing countries.  
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Development Indicators 
In Papua New Guinea though this figure has improved steadily 
from 35 per cent in 2002 to just below 40 per cent in 2012, the 
fact that 60 per cent of population does not have access to 
improved sources of water is a cause for concern. In my previous 
work, I have examined the challenges of improving access to 
water (Anand, 2007a; 2013). The creation of a human right to 
water is a welcome step towards strengthening institutions and 
accountability. However, my previous analysis (Anand, 2007b) 
shows that creating a human right to water does not 
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water for all unless the corresponding duty-bearer institutions 
and participatory mechanisms are all fully developed. 
The picture with regard to access to improved sanitation is 
equally mixed. While oil and gas economies do better than world 
average mineral economies as a group are trailing behind the 
world average. The proportion of population with access to 
improved sanitation increased from around 53 per cent in 2002 
to 60 per cent in 2012 in the 56 mineral rich countries as whole. 
Most of the bottom ten countries on this measure are all 
extractives. In those countries 80 per cent of population does not 
have access to improved sanitation. The consequences for 
especially infant and child health can be very critical indeed. 
 
 
Natural resources and Human Development 
 
The central argument in Mehlum et al (2006) is that whether 
natural resource abundance becomes a ‘curse’ or not is 
determined by institutions. In countries with good institutions, 
resource abundance does not result in a decline in per capita 
incomes but in countries with poor institutions this can happen.  
The relationship between extractive industries and human 
development can be either positive or negative. The links are 









Figure 6: Extractives and human development- an outline of the links. Source: 
Author’s explanation 
Much attention has been focused on avoiding the negative macro-
economic effects (through careful management of exchange rate 
and foreign currency reserves) and consequent fiscal impacts 
(such as unsustainable increase in public expenditure). Limited 
attention has been focused on impacts on human development. 
Pineda and Rodriguez (2010) question the natural resource trap 
idea and argue that the data of 1980-2005 show that there exists 
a positive association between resource abundance and HDI (as 
an indicator of HD).  
 
Botswana, Chile and Malaysia are cited as examples of economies 
that used natural resource boom to maintain an improvement in 
HDI. Data presented in figure 7 suggests that both Chile and 
Malaysia sustained improvements in HDI. In the case of 
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Figure 7: HDI trends in some resource abundant countries 
Source: Based on UNDP,2010a. 
 
 
Human development index is a measure that includes income per 
capita, and indicators of education and life expectancy.  HDI is in 
itself not a full indicator of human development which is about 
enhancing substantive freedoms. However, as a starting point, 
HDI  can throw some light on non income dimensions of well 
being.  To examine whether extractive economies as a group 
perform differently with regard to human development index, we 




























exporting countries tend to have high level of human 
development index than non oil exporting countries, and tend to 
do slightly better than non oil exporting or mineral based 
extractive economies when it comes to control of corruption. 
However, mineral countries tend to do better in terms of voice 
and accountability.  
 












































.6225 .7719 -3.984*** 0.7335 .6771 1.360 
Voice 1996 -0.1935 -0.2458 0.239 -0.2814 -0.1444 -0.627 
Voice 
2005 








-0.3837 -.0735 -1.404 -0.1185 -0.3214 0.910 
N 22 35  33 24  
 
Note: t- statistic from independent samples t-test where equal variances are 
assumed. 
 
One of the arguments in resource trap literature is that natural 





for political agents to participate in political process. Thus, various 
institutions that are essential for governing the relationship 
between individual citizen and the state become instruments for 
private enrichment and corruption. To examine whether 
corruption worsens in resource rich economies, we do some 
simple analysis taking data from 1995 to 2005.  
 
 
Table 7: Institutions and control of corruption in extractives 
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Adj R squared 0.805 0.781 0.778 0.743 0.505 
N 26 51 51 56 56 
 
Dependent variable: Control of corruption in 2005 (WGI Kaufman et al,2008) 
 
These results suggest that human development index, voice and 
accountability and such mechanisms of individual agency may be 
much more significant than whether or not a country is oil based 
or mineral based. These results are preliminary and require 
further careful work. However, these seem to suggest that there 






Only some of the head line indicators have been included in the 
paper. However, the results reported here suggest that while 
extractive sectors can play a very important role, there is need for 
caution and careful policy and institutional analysis to identify 
what works before extractives become the driving force of 
achievement with regard to sustainable development goals.  
Extractive sectors can generate significant revenue to the 
government which can be directed toward health, education and 
key aspects of inclusive social spending with a view to making a 
serious dent on poverty and promoting healthy lives. However, 
this will not happen unless necessary policy instruments 
appropriate to the context are carefully designed through 
consultative process of voice and accountability. We do know that 
international standards mechanisms such as the EITI can help in 
improving the transparency of income generated by natural 
resource sectors. Whether the increased transparency of income 
translates into transparent and accountable allocation of such 
resources to sectors and activities that can have most impact on 
making development inclusive and sustainable is a moot point. 
Analysis conducted but not reported here in the paper showed 
that on many of the development performance indicators such as 
those relevant to the SDGs, there is not much systematic 
difference between countries that have joined the EITI and 
resource rich countries that have not joined the EITI. However, 
our analysis also shows that EITI can make a difference in macro-
economic indicators especially with regard to exchange rate. 
Thus, perhaps EITI is having an effect in reducing ‘Dutch disease’ 
possibility among the extractive economies. However, there is 
now need to make further progress and either build on EITI or 
develop other multi-lateral instruments to encourage, facilitate, 





inclusive and sustainable development. There is a need for further 
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